This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

## ACTION AF-00

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FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0896

INFO DARFUR COLLECTIVE

AMEMBASSY ABUJA

AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

AMEMBASSY ALGIERS

AMEMBASSY ASMARA

AMEMBASSY BAMAKO AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY DAKAR

AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM

AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY NAIROBI

AMEMBASSY NIAMEY

AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT

AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU AMEMBASSY PARIS AMEMBASSY PRETORIA

AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE

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NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR COURVILLE LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2014

TAGS: PREF PREL CD SU
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT DEBY APPEALS FOR HELP

Classified By: Ambassador Marc M. Wall for reasons 1.4 (b and d)

- (C) Summary: Darfur threatens to become a regional catastrophe and Chad proposes hosting a high-level meeting of the Joint Commission on the Humanitarian Cease-Fire in a new attempt to head it off, President Deby told us February 4. In the meeting he requested with the Ambassador, he appealed for more forceful international involvement in Darfur as well as for expanded counter-terrorist assistance. We urge Washington to send a senior representative to the February 15 meeting. End Summary.
- $\P 2.$  (U) The Ambassador was asked February 4 to meet with President Idriss Deby later that morning in the Presidential offices. Deby, looking fit and determined after his recent travels to Paris, Taipei, and Abuja, received the Ambassador in his personal office. Only Special Advisor to the Presidency Allam-mi joined the President. We understand French Ambassador Berceau had met with Deby immediately before. These appointments took place at the same time as Foreign Minister Yamassoum briefed other members of the diplomatic corps on plans to invite African heads of states and other senior representatives to the Joint Commission on the Humanitarian Cease-Fire for Darfur on February 15 in N'Diamena (see septel).

"We Need Your Help

- 13. (C) Deby led off with an account of the weaknesses of Chad's security services. He said Chad lacks the capacity to patrol its long borders or protect its vast territory against terrorist incursions. He referred to several individuals who had been identified in Chad with links to Al Qaeda and who also had connections to Saudi Arabia or Libya. He also noted the Chadian prisoner captured in Afghanistan still held in Guantanamo. He said Chad is at least as exposed to terrorist activity as Niger and Mali. He welcomed U.S. training of the Chadian soldiers under the Pan Sahel Initiative, but stressed that the numbers involved were far too few to meet Chad's enormous needs.
- 14. (C) Turning to the problem of Darfur, Deby warmed up in describing his alarm over the continuing conflict there. The

problem is getting worse, he argued. None of the parties are respecting the cease-fire. The fighting is creating an explosive situation. Chad is getting hit, and other countries in the region will suffer increasingly too if the threat is not contained. In fact, he claimed, Chad risks becoming another Darfur. It had welcomed the Sudanese refugees, but they simply could not stay in eastern Chad for years to come. If the problem persists, the whole region could descend into turmoil like the area surrounding Africa's Great Lakes, he said.

15. (C) Becoming even more insistent, Deby said it is absolutely essential that the cease-fire be respected. Also, the jandjaweed militias must be disarmed, and the humanitarian relief operations must be protected. He described plans to host a high-level meeting of the Joint Commission on the Humanitarian Cease-Fire for Darfur on February 15. President Obasanjo and Africa Union Chairperson Konare are among those who plan to attend (see septel). But he also observed that efforts so far have failed. Representatives were wandering like nomads from N'Djamena to Addis Ababa, Abuja and other capitals in vain attempts to solve the crisis. The international community must step in

more forcefully, It had to force the parties to respect the  $\operatorname{cease-fire}$ , he argued.

"We Hear You"

- 16. (C) The Ambassador responded by noting how much respect he had discerned during his recent consultations in Washington for what Chad is doing on Darfur and with the Sudanese refugees. He noted the high regard he had found there as well as for Chad's cooperation on counter-terrorism and its plan for managing its new oil revenues. He welcomed the collaboration between Chad's and U.S. intelligence services. He agreed that a company of soldiers is not sufficient to meet Chad's counter-terrorist needs. He outlined plans for a significant expansion in defense-related cooperation through programs over the coming year leading up to the proposed Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorist Initiative.
- 17. (C) On Darfur, the Ambassador stressed that the United States shares concerns about the continuing violence there. He noted that five Congressional delegations have visited in the last six months, drawn in part by concerns over the humanitarian tragedy in Darfur and its impact on Chad. He said Washington is looking hard at new measures to address the problem. He referred to the statement by State Department spokesman Richard Boucher February 1 following release of the report by United Nations commission of inquiry on Darfur. The Ambassador mentioned specifically: 1) U.S. support for a tribunal based in Arusha to assure accountability; 2) U.S. proposals for a U.N. peacekeeping mission to support the African Union in Darfur; and 3) consultations in the Security Council on proposals to intensify pressure, including by implementing oil sanctions or other targeted sanctions. He said the United States is ready to work with Chad and others on ways to resolve the problem.

Hopes for an All-Parties Conference

18. (C) On the way out of the meeting, Special Advisor Allam-mi discussed ideas for a peace conference bringing together all parties in the conflict. He said the SLM and JEM do not necessarily represent all Darfurians. He questioned the JEM's agenda or even whether it really represents anyone in Darfur. Is it serious about negotiating peace or is its aim the overthrow of the regime in Khartoum, he asked. If the latter, he observed, it cannot be considered a serious negotiating partner. He believed other representatives should be brought to the table, including those speaking directly for the refugees themselves. He dismissed Libya's recent attempts at hosting a conference on Darfur. He said that effort was limited to tribal leaders. His plan is much more comprehensive, he noted. He saw the process that led to the Naivasha agreements as a model for what is needed on Darfur.

Comment

19. (C) Deby's comments echo those he made last week in a speech at the African Union's meeting in Abuja. He is exasperated by the failure of peace efforts to date; alarmed by what he fears could become a regional catastrophe; and

desperate for a solution. We have little confidence that the proposed high-level meeting of the Joint Cease-Fire Commission in N'Djamena on February 15 will lead to any

breakthroughs. But we believe it deserves to be taken seriously. We believe Washington should send an appropriately senior representative.

10 (U) Khartoum and Tripoli Minimize Considered. WALL

NNNN